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Abstract 
For more than two decades now, current-account imbalances are a crucial issue in the international 
policy debate as they threaten the stability of the world economy. More recently, the government debt 
crisis of the European Union shows that internal current account imbalances inside a currency union 
may also add to these risks. Oil price fluctuations and a contracting monetary policy that reacts on oil 
prices, previously discussed to affect the current account may also be a threat to the currency union by 
changing internal imbalances. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the impact of oil price shocks on 
current account imbalances within a currency union. Differences in institutions, especially labor market 
institutions and trade result in an asymmetric reaction to an otherwise symmetric shock. In this context, 
we show that oil price shocks can have a long-lasting impact on internal balances, as the exchange rate 
adjustment mechanism is not available. The common monetary policy authority, however, can reduce 
such effects by specifying an optimum monetary policy target. Nevertheless, we also show that there is 
no single best solution. CPI, core CPI or an asymmetric CPI target all come at a cost either regarding an 
increase in unemployment or increasing imbalances.  
Keywords: Current account deficit, Oil price shocks, DSGE models, Search and matching labor market, 
Monetary policy 
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11. Introduction
Global current-account imbalances are a crucial issue in the international
policy debate for more than two decades now. The IMF and the G7 countries
repeatedly pointed out at the risks of significant imbalances for the stability of the
world economy. These seem to have materialized in the government debt crisis
that hit the European Union and especially the Eurozone after 2009. Imbalances
between member states in the Eurozone seem to be even more worrying, as an
adjustment of exchange rates that drives balances back to equilibrium is not
available. Instead, real prices and wages have to adjust. The alignment of wages,
however, depends on labor market institutions. As systems differ among member
states, even a symmetric shock, like an oil price shock, can have asymmetric
consequences and, thus, affect imbalances. Therefore, it is of crucial importance,
from both a policy and a theoretical point of view to examine the impact of
an oil price shock on currency-union members with asymmetric labor market
institutions and to discuss possibilities for the joint monetary authority to reduce
the negative consequences of these shocks.
In general, oil prices are volatile and hard to predict (Baumeister and Kilian,
2016). In the last two decades, the world economy experienced in between
1999 and 2008 a period of strong increasing oil prices and from 2008 onward
a period of sharply decreasing oil prices. In June 2008, WTI crude oil was at
157,87 USD per barrel and dropped to 29,67 USD per barrel in January 2016.
Today, in October 2017, the WTI crude oil price is at 52.10 USD per barrel with
a forecast that it remains low for the foreseeable future. Resulting from this
development, we should see an increase in internal imbalances in the currency
union. In a nutshell, current account imbalances are traced back to the presence
of asymmetric or symmetric shocks in specific institutional settings (Chen, Milesi-
Ferretti, and Tressel, 2013; Kim and Yi, 2015).If two countries differ concerning
the use of oil in production, decreasing oil prices improve the trade balance of
oil-intensive exporters, leading to current account surpluses and an improvement
in the net-foreign asset position of these countries. Furthermore, lower oil
prices increase consumer spending and corporate profitability which increases
aggregate demand. It is likely that countries that trade more and are faced with
higher demand rise tradable production and shift more resources to the tradable
sectors. This adds to the increase in current account imbalances. The current
account is brought into equilibrium by real price and exchange rate adjustments.
However, in a monetary union, the exchange rate adjustment mechanism is not
available. Therefore, a higher aggregate demand has to increases wages and
prices stronger in surplus countries compared to deficit countries for the current
account balance to go back to equilibrium. The pace of adjustment, therefore,
depends on institutions. Using a two-country DSGE model of a currency union
with imperfect labor markets, we show this transmission mechanism of oil price
shocks that either affects the stochastic component1 of the oil price but not
1The oil price in our model consists of two components, an endogenous component that
2quantities or oil supply shocks that affect quantities and the endogenous part
of prices but not the stochastic component. Our contribution to the literature
is threefold: first, to all of our knowledge, we are the first to discuss oil price
shocks in a currency union setting with imperfect labor markets, second, we
discuss the possibilities of a central bank to reduce imbalances and, third, we
discuss labor market reforms that could reduce the burden of real adjustments.
Despite that research papers on oil price shocks in currency unions are scarce,
there is a vivid debate about the impact of oil prices on global imbalances either
directly or through a contractionary monetary policy. The effect of oil price shocks
on the current account was first discussed in the late 1970s. Agmon and Laffer
(1978) analyzed wealth and income effects following the oil crises in 1973 and
found that the trade balances and balances of payment of industrialized countries
deteriorated markedly after the oil price shock. Kilian, Rebucci, and Spatafora
(2009) confirm an increase in global imbalances driven by oil price shocks for the
period before the economic and financial market crises. Schubert (2014), using
time-nonseparable preferences, theoretically explains the deterioration and a
gradual improvement over time. Like Agmon and Laffer (1978), Gao, Kim, and
Saba (2014) see the adjustment burden on less energy-intensive products that
react more elastic to changes in income than oil or energy-intensive products.
Using a general-equilibrium model, Backus and Crucini (2000) show that oil
accounts for much of the variation in the terms of trade over the last twenty-five
years and that its quantitative role varies significantly over time. Kilian, Rebucci,
and Spatafora (2009) pay attention to the non-oil tradable goods that are crucial
in determining the size of the impact of oil price shocks on the current account.
Le and Chang (2013) confirm these findings for Asian countries. In building a
two-country DSGE model, Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2011) underpin
these empirical results theoretically and add that the missing link can also be
caused by the simultaneous occurrence of multiple shocks, as well as different
sources of oil price movements and different propagation channels.
As prices of less oil-intensive products drop, Bernanke, Gertler, Watson, Sims,
and Friedman (1997) see a tightening monetary policy as one of the reasons for
a strong real effect and a fast adjustment of the current account. Leduc and
Sill (2004) using a DSGE model, find that 40 percent of the adjustment to oil
prices result from monetary policy, while Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) using
alternate assumptions deny a strong impact. Kilian and Lewis (2011) do also find
no evidence that monetary policy responses to oil price shocks had significant
macroeconomic effects. In this context, Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Kilian (2012)
stress the fact that the source of the oil price shock is crucial to determine the
optimal monetary policy response, Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011), using an
estimated DSGE model, see links in non-oil trade as vital for the transmission
of shocks that affect oil prices and Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Gust (2013) argue
that when policy rates reach their zero lower bound, the propagation of shocks
reacts on market forces and a stochastic component that is independent from equilibrium on
the oil market.
3is changed which results in the persistence that alternative shocks induce to oil
prices.
There are very few papers that, like our model, address oil price shocks in an
environment with imperfect labor markets. One of those is Herrera, Karaki, and
Rangaraju (2017) who use a factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR)
model to analyses job-market behavior after an oil price shock. They show that
the pace of gross job reallocation is slowing. This effect is especially important in
a monetary union, where the exchange rate as adjustment mechanism is absent.
More flexible labor markets help to reduces imbalances as prices and wages can
adjust faster. Unfortunate for EMU, the quality of labor market institutions
varies across member countries (de Pace, 2013). While labor markets are more
flexible among northern members, they are more rigid in the South (Bertola,
2017). For this reason, asymmetric labor markets may reduce the impact of oil
price shocks in some countries, while the effect remains strong in others. In this
paper, we want to explain under which circumstances oil price shocks increase
or decrease imbalances in a currency union. We focus on labor markets, as they
seem to be rigid in the European Union than in the United States (Edmans, Li,
and Zhang, 2014) and less integrated than financial markets. Therefore, labor
markets may be one force that prevents real adjustment to oil price shocks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section
introduces the model; the third section describes the calibration of the model to
a typical EMU member state; the fourth section presents reaction of the model
to oil price and oil supply shocks under different monetary policy targets and
labor market regimes. Finally, the fifth section concludes.
2. The model
We build a two-country, two-sector currency union model with search and
matching frictions in which a representative household maximizes lifetime utility
according to the rational expectations hypothesis. In each period, the household
faces the decision of whether to buy tradables from the domestic or the foreign
economy, to purchase non-tradables, to hold real money balances or to postpone
consumption by buying bonds. Foreign and domestic tradable as well as non-
tradable consumption goods sold by retailers are subject to staggered price
setting (Calvo, 1983). Following Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), we include
the assumption of Uzawa-type preferences. This preference specification allows
the model to be stationary, in the sense that the non-stochastic steady state is
independent of initial conditions (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). Furthermore,
the steady-state is always unique even in the presence of low elasticities of
substitution between the tradable good bundles of the two countries (Bodenstein,
2011). There are two sectors of production in each country. Each sector is divided
into two types of economic entities, firms which produce intermediate goods and
retailers. The trade specification of the model resembles that of Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2006) and, more specifically, Ferrero, Gertler, and Svensson, Lars E. O.
(2008), with the exception that we impose staggered price setting on the level of
the retailers (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999) rather than on the level of
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endogenous separations rather than staggered wage setting.2 Introducing search
and matching labor markets with endogenous separations is, to all our knowledge,
a novel approach in the DSGE literature on current account imbalances.
The preferences of households are expressed by a nested utility function
combining, on the one hand, non-tradables and tradables using a Cobb-Douglas
function and, on the other hand, tradables from the domestic and foreign
economies using a CES specification. This setting is specified in a way which
reflects the fact that households have a preference for domestically produced
products. Additionally, the assumption of a home bias gives rise to a “transfer
effect,” as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) call it, according to which a country sees
a deterioration in its terms of trade if national expenditures decline. We use a
setting with tradable and non-tradable goods, as in a world with exhausted or
nearly exhausted factors, the possibility to shift resources from non-tradable to
tradable production is a necessary precondition for a country to increase exports.
In both sectors of the economy, we have nominal price rigidities. Given
irrevocably fixed exchange rates due to our currency union setting, prices for
tradable goods are identical in both countries. In a steady-state equilibrium,
trade is always balanced. During adjustments following macroeconomic shocks,
it might, nevertheless, be favorable for households in a given country to increase
imports and run up debt. Financial markets are assumed to be imperfect in the
sense that only the bond of the domestic country is internationally tradable.
In our model, labor is, at least in the short run, not mobile between the
two countries. As a result, the imbalances that arise are more persistent than
they would be in a model with factor mobility. We use this assumption since,
compared to the US, intra-EMU labor mobility is still small (Krause, Rinne, and
Zimmermann, 2014).
More specifically, the labor markets in our model are built on the search
and matching model with endogenous job destruction developed by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), in which a worker and a firm in each period have to
decide whether to preserve or to terminate their relationship. Following Zanetti
(2011), Krause and Lubik (2007) and Walsh (2005), we embed the labor market
specification of the Mortensen-Pissarides model of den Haan, Wouter J., Ramey,
and Watson (2000) in a New Keynesian setting.
In each period, unemployed workers search for a job and intermediate goods-
producing firms want to fill their vacancies. The matching function describes
the process of generating job matches by combining unemployed workers with
open vacancies. In contrast to Krause and Uhlig (2012), where a new match
can have an idiosyncratic productivity below the threshold level3, we assume
that the productivity of a new worker is always higher than the threshold to
2Both deviations enable us to analyze labor market reforms as we include search and
matching frictions and endogenous job-separations.
3The threshold productivity defines a specific idiosyncratic productivity, where a firm is
indifferent between continuing or separating a match.
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avoid instantaneous endogenous separations. When a match is generated, wage
bargaining starts. After the firm and the worker have agreed on a specific wage
training starts, enabling the match to become productive in the next period.
At the beginning of each period, firms and workers are forced to separate with
a given probability owing to disturbances exogenous to the model. If a match
survives exogenous separations, the firm is still able to choose to post a vacancy
or to keep the employee. As there are vacancy posting and firing costs for firms
as well as search costs for workers, continuing a match might generate a surplus.
This surplus occurs if firms and workers observe a productivity of the match
that is above a threshold level at which the surplus is zero. Firms that have an
open position post vacancies as long as the value of the vacancy is greater than
zero. If the number of vacancies increases, however, the probability of finding a
convenient match diminishes. This results in a reduction in the expected value
of an open position. In equilibrium, free market entry ensures that the value of
a vacancy is always zero.
To sum up, the model economy is characterized by nominal rigidities in the
goods market and search and matching frictions in the labor markets. It consists
of a representative household, a production sector comprised of representative
intermediate goods-producing firms and a continuum of retail firms, indexed by
i, with i ∈ [0, 1] in each country of the currency union, as well as a common
central bank. Firms producing tadables can sell their goods in both countries
and households can engage in international borrowing.
2.1. The representative household
Our economy is inhabited by a large number of infinitive living identical
households consuming aggregates of domestic and imported monopolistic goods
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Owing to labor market search frictions any household
is either employed or unemployed. In general, labor is supplied inelastically. As
a second source of income, households own shares in domestic firms and receive
dividends Dt from them. We assume that households in the domestic economy
and the foreign country have the same preferences and factor endowments,
defined over a composite consumption good Ct and real money holdings Mt/Pt.
As described by Merz (1995), we assume a perfect insurance system where
households can insure themselves against variations in income. This assumption
removes heterogeneity among households within a given country and enables us
to consider the optimization problem of a representative household maximizing
expected lifetime utility. During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the expected lifetime
utility function is given by
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
lnCt + κm ln
(
Mt
Pt
)]
, (1)
where βt = e
ςt
1+ψ(lnCt−ϑ)βt−1 for t ≥ 0, β0 = 1 represents the endogenous discount
factor, with the parameter ψ that is assumed to be small and the shock term ςt,
and κm that denotes a scaling parameter for utility from real money holdings
with κm > 0. The consumption index Ct is defined as
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Ct ≡ CO
χ
t Ol
1−χ
t
ι(1− ι) . (2)
with COt as non-oil tradable and non-tradable composite and Olt as oil
related products. Non-oil goods are defined as goods that use oil not as the
major input and whose prices are not linked to the oil price, like it is with natural
gas.
COt ≡ C
ι
T tC
1−ι
Nt
ι(1− ι) . (3)
Tradable goods CT,t can be obtained from the domestic CH,t or from the
foreign economy CF,t while non-tradables CN,t are produced at home, only.
Following Ferrero, Gertler, and Svensson, Lars E. O. (2008), we employ a Cobb-
Douglas4 specification with ι as the proportion of total expenditure devoted to
tradable goods.
CT,t =
[
α
1
γCH,t + (1− α) 1γC
γ−1
γ
F,t
] γ
γ−1
(4)
In this specification, γ measures the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods and α is the share parameter of the CES-function. Household
demand is derived by minimizing costs for the specific goods bundles.
CH,t = α
(
PT,t
PH,t
)γ
CT,t CF,t = (1− α)
(
PT,t
PF,t
)γ
CT,t (5)
CN,t = (1− ι) Pt
PN,t
COt CT,t = ι
Pt
PT,t
COt, PG,j,t =
(
Pj,t
χ
)χ(
PO,t
(1− χ)
)(1−χ)
where PG,t denotes the price of a bundle of oil and the composite of tradable
and non-tradable goods, while Pt stands for the price of a bundle of tradable
and non-tradable goods, PT,t is the price index for domestic tradable and foreign
tradable and PN,t for non-tradable goods. A household chooses consumption,
nominal money and bond holdings subject to a budget constraint of the form
PG,tCt +Bt/Rt +Mt = Bt−1 + PG,tYt +Dt + %t +Mt−1, (6)
for t = 0, 1, 2... . At the beginning of period t, the household receives a lump-sum
transfer %t from the central bank and dividends Dt from the representative
intermediate-goods-producing firm. Total income amounts to Yt. The household
enters period t with bonds Bt−1 and Mt−1 units of money. Furthermore, the
4We assume a unit elasticity between non-traded and traded goods which is typical but not
undisputed in the literature. Based on the simulations of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) with an
unit elasticity, a elasticity of two and one of 100, our prior is not to find a strong impact of the
elasticity on our simulation results.
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mature bonds are providing additional Bt−1 units which are all sold at the
beginning of the period and might be used to purchase Bt new bonds at the
nominal cost Bt/Rt with Rt as the nominal interest rate between t and t+ 1.
Solving the intertemporal optimization problem, we derive the following first-
order conditions:
Λt = C−1t (7)
Etβt,t+1 = Et
pit+1
Rt
(8)
κm
mt
= Λt − βtEt Λt
pit+1
, (9)
where Λt is the shadow price and βt,t+1 = βtΛt+1/Λt is the stochastic discount
factor. Real money holdings are defined as mt = Mt/PG,t. Combining the
first-order conditions with respect to Ct and Bt, equation (7) and equation (9),
yields the standard consumption Euler equation:
βtEt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1
= Et
PG,t+1
RtPG,t
. (10)
We distinguish three different statuses of employment of the representative
household: let Ut, WNj,t and Wj,t(at) denote respectively the present discounted
value of an unemployed, newly employed and continuously employed worker,
with j being an index for the two sectors of each economy. In case of unemploy-
ment, the worker enjoys a real return b and expects to move into employment
with probability pj(θj,t), becoming employed either in the tradable or in the
non-tradable sector. Therefore, the present discounted income stream of an
unemployed worker is
Uj,t = b+ Etβt,t+1
[
pj(θj,t)WNj,t+1 + (1− pj(θj,t))Uj,t+1
]
. (11)
Following Pissarides (2000) , the flow value of being unemployed, b = h+ρww,
consists of the value of home production or leisure h and unemployment benefits
ρww, where ρw represents the replacement ratio with 0 < ρw < 1 and w the
steady-state average wage. The second part of Equation (10) describes the
expected capital gain from a change of state. As an equilibrium condition, the
value of unemployment has to be identical in the both sectors (Ut = UH,t = UN,t).
The worker’s value from holding a job with idiosyncratic match productivity
aj,t, that is assumed to be log-normal distributed with the cumulative distribution
function F (·), is given by
Wj,t(aj,t) = wj,t(aj,t) (12)
+ Etβt,t+1
[
(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
a˚j,t+1
Wj,t+1(aj,t+1)dF (aj,t+1) + ρj,t+1Uj,t+1
]
.
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Equation (12) tells us that an employed worker is paid a sector-specific wage
wj,t(aj,t), and that if he or she survives exogenous and endogenous job destruction,
which happens with a total probability of ρt+1, the match will start to produce
goods.
The present-discounted value of a new match is
WNj,t = wNj,t (13)
+ Etβt,t+1
[
(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
a˚j,t+1
Wj,t+1(aj,t+1)dF (aj,t+1) + ρj,t+1Uj,t+1
]
.
Please note, that equation (13) differs from equation (12) in the wages of new
workers, only. The wages of new workers, wNj,t, will be different from those of
continuing workers, wj,t(aj,t) owing to the presence of firing costs that a firm
has to bear if it decides to fire a worker. As in the first period no endogenous
job destruction takes place, firing costs in this period do not influence the wages
of new workers.
2.2. Retail firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistic competitive retailers on the unit
interval indexed by i that purchases goods from intermediate goods-producing
firms. Each retailer first transforms the intermediate good Y Gi,t into a differ-
entiated retail good using a linear production technology. During each period
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . a retailer j of sector j = H,F,N sells Yj,t(i) units of the retail
goods at the nominal price Pj,t(i). Let Yj,t denote the composite of individual
retails goods which is described by the CES aggregator of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977):
Y αi,t =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)(γ−1)/γdi
]γ/(γ−1)
Y αi,tO
1−α
i,t = Y G,i,t
where  with  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated
retail goods. Then, the demand curve facing each retailer i is given by
Yj,t(i) =
[
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t
]− [
Pj,t
PG,j,t
]
Yj,t, (14)
where Pj,t is the aggregate price index of home-produced or foreign-produced
tradable and non-tradable goods and PG,t is the price of the composite of non-oil
tradable and oil product.
Pj,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)1−dj
]1/(1−)
, (15)
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for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . As in Calvo (1983), only a randomly and independently
chosen fraction 1−ν of the firms in the retail sector are allowed to set their prices
optimally, whereas the remaining fraction ν sets their prices by charging the
previous period’s price adjusted by steady-state inflation. Hence, a retail firm i,
which can choose its price in period t, chooses the price Pˆj,t(i) to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βν)jβt,t+s
( Pˆj,t(i)
Pj,t+s
)−
Yjt+s
(
Pˆj,t(i)
Pj,t+s
−mcj,t+s
) , (16)
where βt,t+s is the stochastic discount factor used by the firms and mcj,t stands
for the real marginal costs. The first-order condition for this problem is
Pˆj,t(i) =

(− 1)
∞∑
s=0
(νβ)jEt(Λj,t+sP γj,t+sYj,t+smcj,t+s)
∞∑
s=0
(νβ)jEt(Λj,t+sP γ−1j,t+sYj,t+s)
. (17)
2.3. The central bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to a modified5 Taylor
(1993) rule:
ln (Rt/R¯) = ρr ln(Rt−1/R¯) + ρy
(
δ ln(Yt/Y¯ ) + (1− δ) ln(Y ∗t /Y¯ ∗)
)
,
+ρpi
(
δ ln(piH,t/p¯iH) + (1− δ) ln(pi∗F,t/p¯i∗F )
)
+mprt
(18)
where R¯, Y¯ and p¯iH , p¯i∗F are the steady-state values of the gross nominal interest
rate, output and core CPI gross inflation rate for domestically and foreign-
produced goods, and mprt
i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2rt) is a shock to monetary policy. The
coefficient of the degree of interest rate smoothing ρr and the reaction coefficients
to inflation and output, ρpi and ρy, are positive. The parameter δ denotes the
relative steady-state size of the home country vice-versa the foreign country.
2.4. Trade
The real value of net exports is defined using the weighted difference between
home production and tradable consumption NXt ≡ PH,tYH,t−PTt,tCTt,tPt . Using
this definition, we specify total nominal bond holdings Bt according to
Bt
Pt
= Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
+NXt. (19)
5The article of Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) discusses the properties of Taylor rules within
a European Monetary Union. They end up at the conclusion that a Taylor rule should be
similar to pre-EMU ones. In this paper, our modified Taylor rule for the EMU-area follows
this assumption.
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We apply the standard incomplete markets model6 and assume that inter-
national financial markets clear (Bt +B∗t = 0), with B∗t as nominal holdings of
the domestic bond by foreign households, so that the net change of real bond
holding reflects the current account CAt ≡ Bt−Bt−1Pt .
Given two sectors in each economy, it is convenient to define a set of relative
prices. The relative price of non-tradables to tradables is defined as Xt ≡
PN,t/PT,t and the terms of trade as > ≡ PF,t/PH,t. Using these definitions and
their foreign counterparts gives us the expression of the real exchange rate Qt in
terms of the relative price of non-tradables to tradables and the terms of trade
Qt =
[
α>1−γ + (1− α)
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] 1
1−γ (X∗t
Xt
)1−ι
. (20)
2.5. Domestic equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium, the value of an open vacancy is zero in both sectors. Making
use of the vacancy posting condition (31), combined with equations (32) and
(38), yields the job creation condition
cj
qj(θj,t)
= (1− η)Etβt,t+1
[
mcj,t+1Aj,t+1(aNj,t+1 − a˚j,t+1)− Tj
]
. (21)
Equation (21) states that the expected hiring cost that a firm has to pay
must be equal to the expected gain from a filled job. Jobs are destroyed by the
firm when the realization of the worker’s productivity is below the reservation
productivity. The reservation productivity is defined as the value of ajt, which
makes the firm’s surplus received from a job equal to zero,
Jjt(˚aj,t) + Tj = 0. (22)
The job destruction condition is derived using equations (33), (37) and (22)
and is given by
mcj,tAj,t˚aj,t − bj − η(1−η)cθt + (1− ζjt)Tj = 0
+Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj )mcj,t+1Aj,t+1
∫∞
a˚j,t+1
(aj,t+1 − a˚j,t+1)dF (aj,t+1)
.
(23)
with cjθj,t representing the average hiring costs of all firms in either of the
two sectors of the economy.
As in Zanetti (2011), the equilibrium average real wage is a weighted average
of continuing workers with weight ωCj,t = (1 − ρj,t)nj,t−1nj,t while that for new
workers is 1− ωCjt. Therefore, the average real wage is
6There is a wide discussion about the impact of imperfect financial market assumptions in
open-economy models. For instance Devereux and Sutherland (2011) discuss the impact of
this assumption on monetary policy, while Bodenstein (2011) compares different imperfect
market assumptions for open economies.
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wj,t = η
[
mcj,tAj,taj,t + cθt + (ωcj,t − ζj,t)Tj
]
+ (1− ηj)b, (24)
where aj,t = ωCj,tH (˚aj,t) + (1− ωCj,t)aNj,t is the average idiosyncratic productivity
across jobs and H (˚aj,t) = E(a,j,t|aj,t > a˚j,t) represents the average productivity
for continuing workers. The aggregate output, net of vacancy costs, amounts to
yj,t = nj,tAj,taj,t − cj,tvj,t, (25)
with nj,t as the number of workers employed in sector j. Non-tradable production
must equal demand
YN,t = CN,t Y ∗N,t = C∗N,t,
as must tradable production
YH,t = CH,t + C∗H,t,
with C∗H,t as the demand for home tradable goods from abroad. Combining
this relation with equation (19) reveals that the foreign trade balance in units of
home consumption QtNX∗t must equal the negative home trade balance NXt.
Now we make use of the market clearing condition for home production and
include the demand functions for home-produced tradables, the definition of the
real exchange rate and the definition of the terms of trade and the relative price
of non-tradables to tradables, which yields
YH,t = α
[
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] γ
1−γ
CT,t + (1− α)
[
α>1−γt + (1− α)
] γ
1−γ
C∗T,t.
(26)
For domestic and foreign non-tradables we get
YN,t =
1− ι
ι
(Xt)−1 CT,t Y ∗N,t =
1− ιF
ιF
(X∗t )
−1
C∗T,t.
Given that bond markets clear, we are able to get an expression for net
exports in terms of non-tradable to tradable prices and the terms of trade
NXt = (Xt)ι−1
{[
α+ (1− α)>1−γt
] 1
1−γ
YH,t − CT,t
}
.
Furthermore, the current account can be expressed as
CAt = (Rt−1 − 1)Bt−1
Pt
+NXt.
Finally, we can express tradable consumption in terms of aggregate consump-
tion for the home and the foreign country
CT,t = ι (Xt)1−ι Ct C∗T,t = ι (X∗t )
1−ι
C∗t .
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In the steady-state equilibrium, the household’s bonds and money holdings are
Bt = Bt+1 = 0 and %t = Mt−Mt−1, which ensures that any seigniorage revenue
is rebated to the households. Furthermore, international financial markets must
clear, which implies that Bt +B∗t = 0, where B∗t represents the nominal bond
holdings of domestic assets by foreign households.
3. Calibration
Household preferences are characterized by six parameters: the steady-
state discount factor, the partial elasticity for tradables and non-tradables, the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign-produced tradables, the
home bias and the two elasticities of substitution for varieties of a tradable or
non-tradable good. The periods of the model are calibrated to quarters and we
assume both countries and both sectors to be symmetrical. Parameters, therefore,
are the same if not indicated otherwise. We set the steady-state discount factor
to β = .995 which is in line with the most recent DSGE models of the Eurozone
(Poutineau and Vermandel, 2015), and implies an annual steady-state interest
rate of 2 percent. For relative risk aversion we choose the standard value of
σ = 2 (Benchimol and Fourcans, 2012) while Smets and Wouters (2003) suggest
a smaller value of 1 and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) estimate a posterior
mean that implies a significantly higher risk aversion7 of above 9.
In the literature, we find a variety of definitions distinguishing tradables
from non-tradables. We follow Schmillen (2013) who extend a study by Jensen
and Kletzer (2012) for the service sectors to assign tradability to NACE sectors.
Given this definition, the size of the tradable sector for France is slightly higher
than 53 percent of GDP; for Italy, the share is slightly higher than 57 percent
and Germany has the highest tradable share at 62 percent. Some southern EMU
countries like Greece, however, have much lower tradable shares. We set the
tradable share to 55 percent, which in 2012 was the average for EMU countries
and use this value to calculate the partial elasticities for the Cobb-Douglas
function. We follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) in setting the preference share
parameter to α = 0.7 and the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign tradables to γ = 2.0. The first value reflects the fact that Europeans
and Americans attach a consumption weight of 70 percent to their own domestic
products. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables is
set according to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)8.
We calibrate the labor market of the model to reproduce the structural
characteristics of a typical EMU country. The unemployment rate is set to
u = 9.5 percent, which is the long-term average among EMU countries. According
to Hobijn and Sahin (2007), the quarterly separation rates are 6 percent for
7We tested those values in a sensitivity analysis but the impact on current account imbalances
and foreign debt was neglectable.
8Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006) discuss the issue of an estimation
bias using aggregate trade data which results in a lower than unity elasticity of substitution .
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Spain and between 3 and 4 percent for France and Germany9. Given that the
data reflects the period of the Great Moderation and that separations seem to
have increased during the crisis, we set the total separation rate to ρ = 0.05,
which is in the upper range of estimates. Unfortunately, the data does not
contain information on the share of the endogenous and exogenous separation in
the total separation rate, which, therefore, has to be calibrated using the job
creation and job destruction function. The reservation productivity threshold of
a˚ = 1.8 is calculated at the steady-state intersection of the job destruction and
job creation curve. We follow den Haan, Wouter J., Ramey, and Watson (2000)
in assuming the idiosyncratic productivity to be log-normally distributed. As
Germany is the biggest country in the Eurozone, we mimic the wage distribution
of this country, which we have calculated using SOEP data. The mean of F (.),
therefore, is calibrated at µln = 2.54 and the value of its standard deviation equal
to σln = 0.48. We, furthermore, assume that the productivity of new matches is
always in the 0.95th percentile of F (.) and therefore always above the threshold
productivity an > a˚, which implies that new matches never separate. Matching
efficiency10 differs to a great extent in the Eurozone. Countries like France,
Spain, and Italy had a high matching efficiency in the past where estimates
range between χ = 0.6 and χ = 0.8 (Ibourk, 2004; Destefanis and Fonseca, 2007;
Ahamdanech-Zarco, Bishop, Grodner, and Liu, 2009). Germany is perceived
to have a low efficiency, calibrated between χ = 0.2 and χ = 0.3 (Jung and
Kuhn, 2014; Krause and Uhlig, 2012). Recently, efficiency has tended to increase
in Germany (Fahr and Sunde, 2009; Hillmann, 2009) but shrunk in the other
countries mentioned (Arpaia, Kiss, and Turrini, 2014). We, therefore, follow
Lubik and Krause (2014) and set the matching efficiency11 to χ = 0.5, which is
in line with the long-term unemployment level of the Eurozone.
The elasticity of a match w.r.t. unemployment is calibrated to ξ = .7,
which reflects estimates by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for Germany and France,
Kohlbrecher, Merkl, and Nordmeier (2013) for Germany and Broersma (1997)
for the Netherlands and is in line with the studies surveyed in Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001). As is standard in the literature, the Nash bargaining coefficient
9The value for Germany is extremely close to ρ = 0.03, the separation rate calculated by
Kohlbrecher, Merkl, and Nordmeier (2013) using German administrative data.
10The matching efficiency in the Eurozone is perceived to be lower than that of the United
States (Jung and Kuhn, 2014). Lubik (2013) estimated the Beveridge curve for the US using
data from 2000 to 2008. The point estimate for the matching efficiency is m = 0.8 which is
significantly lower than the matching efficiency we set for the Eurozone. Most studies like
Jung and Kuhn calibrate the US matching efficiency lower between 0.5 and 0.6.
11We also run the model with a significant lower matching efficiency of 0.23 following Jung
and Kuhn (2014). The volatility of total vacancies and unemployment is too low in this
specification, so that we returned to the standard specification. We could improve the buisness
cylce statistics by setting the bargaining power according to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). If
we, however, run the model with the standard matching efficiency and the Hagedon-Manovskii
specification, the business cycle statistics better matched the data (Business cycle properties
for this calibration are available in an online supplement). We did not use this specification as
it was inconsistent with the long-term unemployment rate of EU-countries and the distribution
of wages.
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used in the wage-setting equation is set to η = 0.5, such that workers and firms
have the same bargaining power12. The vacancy posting costs in the baseline
scenario c = 5.2 and the unemployment benefits b are inferred from the steady-
state job destruction and job creation conditions. The parameter measuring
leisure is calibrated to h = 0.3 so that the income from not working (b and h) is
worth 77 percent of w. Firing costs T are set to 67 percent, which is calculated
as the EMU average using the World Development Indicators (WDI) database,
while the replacement rate is 60 percent of the mean wage. This is in line with the
study by van Vliet, Been, Caminada, and Goudswaard (2012) which calculates
a replacement rate of between 50 and 60 percent for most EU-countries. The
core countries of the Eurozone have values above 60 percent while Malta and
members of the Eastern enlargement round have lower values (30 to 40 percent).
As is common in the literature, the parameter measuring the market power
of retailer is set to ε = 11. This implies a markup over marginal costs of 10
percent and reflects empirical findings. The Calvo parameter that governs the
frequency of price adjustments is following Taylor and Woodford (1999) set to
ν = 0.75 such that the average binding of prices is 4 quarters. As is common, we
normalize steady-state inflation to unity. The Taylor rule is calibrated following
Taylor and Woodford (1999), and implies a monetary policy response to inflation
equal to ρpi = 1.5, a response to a change in output of ρy = .5 and a degree of
interest rate smoothing of ρr = .32.
Finally, we specify the shock processes. In line with most of the literature,
we calibrate the productivity shock such that the baseline model replicates the
standard deviation of output in the Eurozone, which on average is 1.64. The
standard deviation of the shock in either of the two sectors consequently amounts
to σa = 0.0087, while the shock persistence parameter is ρa = 0.94. From Crespo-
Cuaresma and Fernandez-Amador (2013) it follows that the standard deviation
of time preference13 shocks should be roughly similar to that of supply shocks
from 1990 onward, while supply shocks had twice the standard deviation of
time preference shocks in the 1960s. We set the standard deviation of the
time preference shock to σa = 0.013 and the shock persistence parameter to
ρa = 0.94 reflecting the importance of time preference shocks14 for the Eurozone
(Wyplosz, 2013). We follow the findings of Uhlig (2005) that monetary policy
shocks contribute to less than 10 percent of the volatility of output in setting
the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock to σa = 0.0016 with a
persistence of ρa = 0.25. The matching efficiency shocks are assumed to have a
standard deviation of σa = 0.0016 and a persistence of ρa = 0.25. These values
are in-line with those of estimated DSGE models of the Eurozone (Smets and
Wouters, 2003; Ratto, Roeger, and Veld, 2009).
12A low bargaining power of workers specification following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
can be found in the online supplement to this paper (Table 1)
13Time preference shocks affect the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution on consump-
tion, they are also referred to as demand shocks.
14We also account for asymmetric time preference shocks but, in difference to Wyplosz,
assume the same standard deviation of shocks.
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4. Results
In this section, we show the impact of two shocks on the current account and
the foreign debt of the foreign country, oil price shocks and oil supply shocks. Oil
prices in our model have two components, an endogenous component adjusting
prices to market conditions and a stochastic part that let the oil price deviate from
its fundamental value. The reasons for this deviation can be manifold including
expectations, imperfect financial markets, and third country effects. In the oil
price shock scenario, the shock affects the stochastic component of the oil price
while oil supply remains stable. There is, of course, a reaction of the fundamental
value as sectors of the economy adjust, but this response is rather small. The
second shock is a positive oil supply shock. With this shock, households and
firms have more oil available that is needed for consumption purposes and the
production of non-oil goods. We see a reaction of the fundamental component
of the oil price but no response of the stochastic component. Compared to
previous papers, the impact of oil price shocks and oil supply shocks on the
current account is more persistent as we included imperfect labor markets. In
the figures in appendix (7.4), it can be easily seen that labor market flexibility
reduces imbalances within the currency union with both of the two shocks15.
4.0.1. Increasing Oil prices
In Figures 1, 2 and 3, we have visualized the response of the model to
a positive oil price shock of one standard deviation. On impact, output in
both sectors decreases, while prices of non tradable goods decline (Figure 1).
Households have to pay more for oil products so that they spend relatively less on
non-oil products. The decrease in demand lowers prices of non-oil products even
that oil input prices increase. As oil is more important in tradable production,
costs of tradable commodities increase more than costs of non-tradables. This
has the immediate effect that we have a downward pressure on interest on
physical capital, labor demand and wages. A fall in the productivity of workers
decreases the value of a match, the threshold idiosyncratic productivity increases
(Figure 3) and workers who would otherwise have remain employed are now fired.
Firms stop hiring unemployed workers, as the value of an open position falls.
Vacancies, therefore, experience a sharp drop in the tradable and a lesser drop in
the non-tradable sector. Endogenous separations also increase, as less productive
workers were set off. In sum, tradable and non-tradable sectors produce less
and reduce employment by posting fewer vacancies and releasing less-productive
workers.
The decrease in vacancies and the increase in exogenous separations reduces
employment and increases unemployment. Owing to price rigidities, not all firms
are able to adjust prices in the first period so that the response of prices to the
15Recently, the impact of the labor market for current account imbalances finds more
attention. Baas and Belke (2014) discuss the impact of labor market reforms for the absorption
of a variety of shocks. They find that countries that reformed labor markets and increased
flexibility, in sum, reduced their imbalances.
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shock is spread out over time. Therefore, we see a gradual increase in tradable
prices relative to non-tradables, as tradable companies suffer more from higher
input prices. Tradable prices get higher and consumer substitute non-tradable
goods for tradables. As demand increases, firms in the non-tradable sector
increase hiring and reduce endogenous separations. The non-tradable sector
produces more goods and can overcompensate the negative impact of the oil
price shock after a few quarters.
The increase in tradable prices also reduces foreign demand for domestic
tradable goods. As foreign tradable goods, by assumption, are more scarce, they
have a higher relative price compared to home tradables, that change relatively
less to an oil price shock. Households in home and foreign now substitute
home tradables for foreign tradables, which results in a depreciation of the
real exchange rate of the home country. In foreign, production of tradable and
non-tradables increases, firms hire more workers and fire less. However, this
comes at a cost for the non-tradable sector that sees rising labor costs and
reduces output shortly after the shock. The current account of the home country
turns into deficit, and the foreign debt of the foreign country is diminished.
Figure 1 on page 28 and Figure 2 on page 29 about here
In our model, wages are bargained in the second stage of a two-stage process.
In the first stage, workers and firms decide whether to match or not, in the
second stage, the individual wages are negotiated according to, inter alia, the
idiosyncratic productivity. The impact of the shock on average wages is not
apparent. As total factor productivity decreases, there is a negative stimulus
on the average wage. The average idiosyncratic productivity, however, increases
with falling endogenous separations, serving as a positive stimulus. In the
first periods after the shock, wages increase as job separations and average
idiosyncratic productivity rise sharply, overcompensating for the decrease in
total factor productivity. Shortly after that, less new workers are hired, which
reduces average idiosyncratic productivity and, therefore, average wages (Figure
3).16
4.0.2. Oil price shocks and monetary policy
In this section, we discuss the possibilities of the central bank to reduce
current account imbalances caused by oil price shocks. To describe the monetary
policy of the central bank, we use a Taylor rule. In the economic literature,
different price indices are used, CPI, core CPI and GDP deflator. While it is
widely agreed that targeting the GDP deflator is an inferior monetary policy
strategy in the wake of oil price shocks (Pierdzioch and Kamps, 2002), we use
the former two. With regard to current account imbalances, targeting CPI
16Please note that we assumed that the productivity of new workers is solidly above average
in the first period to avoid immediate separations.
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is the superior strategy as the current account deficit is smaller than in the
case where the central bank targets core CPI. This, however, comes at a cost.
Unemployment is higher and more persistent as in the core CPI case, while prices
of non-oil goods fall stronger and prevent firms from hiring in the non-tradable
sector. Employment in the tradable sector, however, is more stable.
If the central bank assigns different weights to the member countries of the
currency union, this increases current account imbalances compared to core CPI.
Labor markets, however, are more stable if the exporting country has a higher
weight and unemployment increases less compared to the core CPI target. In
any way, targeting CPI core inflation and assigning different weights to currency
union members is superior to the CPI inflation target.
4.0.3. Increasing Oil supply
In the previous section, we showed that an oil price shock that does not affect
supply worsens the current account of the country with a higher share of export
goods. Now, we visualize the impact of an oil supply shock (figures 3 and 4). Oil
is consumed by households and needed for the production of tradable and non-
tradable goods. For non-tradable production, however, relatively less oil is used.
In sum, increasing oil supply enhances production possibilities. As the demand
of the tradable sector for oil is higher, it profits more than proportionally from
an increase in supply. The increase in production, nevertheless, depends on the
availability of workers. Both, tradable and non-tradable firms start hiring, but,
as labor is more productive there, the tradable companies can pay higher wages.
Again, we see an increase in average productivity that is accompanied by a
decrease in idiosyncratic productivity. Rising labor demand reduces endogenous
separations so that more workers with a low idiosyncratic productivity are in the
market. Wages, therefore, could decline as idiosyncratic productivity is lower or
they could increase, as average productivity is higher. In our example, wages
increase, and households have higher earnings.
Figure 3 on page 27 and Figure 4 on page 30 about here
In sum, tradable firms attract more workers, so that employment in the
non-tradable sector is reduced. Because of labor market rigidities, this process
is time-consuming. In the first periods after an oil supply shock output of
the non-tradable sector increases. However, a higher tradable labor demand
makes non-tradable firms to hire less workers. Relative home tradable prices are
now lower than foreign tradable or non-tradable good prices so that households
demand more home tradable goods resulting in a current account surplus.
As more tradable goods are available, prices have to fall to let supply meet
demand. Households then shift demand to home tradable goods and reduce
consumption of non-tradables. The current account of the home country is in
surplus and the foreign debt of the foreign country increases.
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4.0.4. Oil supply shocks and monetary policy
With oil price shocks, a core CPI inflation target was the superior monetary
policy strategy. With regard to oil supply shocks, a core CPI target is also
superior to a CPI inflation target. The current account surplus of the home
country is lower than with a CPI target scenario. Concerning weights, however,
it would be beneficial to attribute a higher weight for the bigger exporter.
This reduces current account imbalances, fluctuations in unemployment and
vacancies. Regarding a stable production, however, a core CPI inflation target
is beneficial. Tradable and non-tradable production react less in this setting
even that fluctuations in prices of non-oil products are higher than with an
asymmetric target.
5. Conclusion
Current account imbalances are at the core of the government debt crises in
Europe and represent crucial issues in the international policy debate. In this
paper, we analyzed the impact of oil price shocks and oil supply shocks on the
current account and discussed monetary policy strategies to reduce imbalances.
According to our model, the reduction of oil price since 2016 could widen current
account imbalances in the Eurozone. By including search and matching labor
markets, we show that the imbalances can be quite persistent, as the labor market
reacts sluggishly to changes in relative prices. In such a setting, the central
bank can target core CPI, a CPI index without prices of oil products, to balance
current accounts. This, however, comes at the cost of higher unemployment. In
the wake of oil price shocks targeting core CPI is the superior monetary strategy.
With oil supply shocks, an asymmetric monetary policy target attaching more
weight for the leading exporter seems to be superior regarding for reducing
current account imbalances. Additionally, fluctuations in unemployment are
lower and prices of non-oil goods more stable than in the symmetric core CPI
case, as the central bank adopts a more contractionary monetary policy that
reduces the boom triggered by additional oil supply. The costs of this strategy,
nevertheless, are higher fluctuations in tradable and non-tradable production.
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Figure 3: Positive oil supply shock
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
pc
t. 
de
v.
 f.
 s
te
ad
y-
st
at
e
10-3 Tradable output
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
pc
t. 
de
v.
 f.
 s
te
ad
y-
st
at
e
10-3 Non-tradable output
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
pc
t. 
de
v.
 f.
 s
te
ad
y-
st
at
e
10-3 Unemployment
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
pc
t. 
de
v.
 f.
 s
te
ad
y-
st
at
e
Vacancies
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
a
bs
ol
. d
ev
. f
. s
te
ad
y-
st
at
e
Price index (non-oil)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
a
bs
ol
. d
ev
. f
. s
te
ad
y-
st
at
e
Foreign debt of foreign country
Oil supply shock
MP asymmetric preferences
Price index with oil prices
Impulse response functions
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Figure 1: Positive oil price shock
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Figure 2: Positive oil price shock
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Figure 4: Positive oil supply shock
Impulse response functions
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the model variables to an oil supply
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
7. Appendix (not for publication)
7.1. The labor market
During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , an intermediate goods-producing firm
posts a vacancy or continues the match from the previous period. Each single
job has the status filled or vacant. Because of matching frictions, it is assumed
that the process of job search and hiring is time-consuming and costly for both
the worker and the firm. If a firm finds a suitable worker, both form a match.
The number of job matches depends on the matching function mj,t(uj,t, vj,t),
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where vj,t denotes the number of vacancies in both sectors of the economy, home-
produced tradable and non-tradable goods j = H,N , and uj,t is the number of
unemployed workers searching in sector j. We assume a Cobb-Douglas matching
function, where ξ denotes the partial elasticities
mj,t(uj,t, vj,t) = χuξj,tv
1−ξ
j,t , (27)
0 < ξ < 1 and χ is a scale parameter reflecting the efficiency of the matching
process. Defining labor market tightness as θjt = vj,t/uj,t and making use of
the CRS property of mj,t, we write the job-finding probability in sector j for an
unemployed worker as
p(θj,t) = mj,t(uj,t, vj,t)/uj,t = χθ1−ξj,t , (28)
and the probability that a searching firm in this sector will find a worker as
q(θj,t) = mj,t(uj,t, vj,t)/vj,t = χθ−ξj,t . (29)
The tighter the labor market, the easier it is for unemployed workers to find
a job. Equation (29) implies that the higher the number of vacancies vjt for
a given number of unemployed workers searching in this sector, uj,t, the more
difficult it is for firms to fill vacant positions.
At the beginning of any period t, job separations take place as a result of
an exogenous negative shock with probability ρxj . Firm and worker may decide
to dissolve a match endogenously if the realization of the worker’s idiosyncratic
productivity of aj,t is below a certain threshold productivity a˚j,t. The probability
of endogenous job destruction is given by ρnj,t = P (aj,t < a˚j,t) = F (˚aj,t). The
total job separation rate, therefore, is ρj,t = ρxj + (1− ρxj )ρnj,t. As in den Haan,
Wouter J., Ramey, and Watson (2000), the idiosyncratic productivity aj,t is
drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean µln and standard deviation σln.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), new matches have a productivity
of aNj,t, which ensures that their productivity is always above the productivity
threshold a˚j,t, and that all jobs produce before being destroyed. New matches in t,
mj,t, become productive for the first time in t+1. Consequently, the employment
in each sector evolves according to nj,t = (1− ρj,t)nj,t−1 +mj,t−1(uj,t−1, vj,t−1).
As we normalize total employment to unity, the sum of unemployed persons
becomes ut = (1− nH,t − nN,t).
The representative intermediate goods-producing firm
If an intermediate goods-producing firms posts a vacancy, it bears costs cj .
Labor is the only input in the production function. At the beginning of each
period, old and new matches draw an idiosyncratic, job-specific productivity
aj,t. Production in each sector is subject to a productivity shock, common to
all firms. If the realization of a worker’s idiosyncratic productivity is above the
reservation productivity a˚j,t, the firms will produce output using labor. The total
factor productivity Aj,t follows an AR(1) process, ln(Aj,t) = ρAj ln(Aj,t−1)+Aj ,
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where ρAj is the serial correlation coefficient with 0 < ρAj < 1 and Aj follows a
white noise process with standard deviation σAj .
We define the present discounted value of expected profits from a vacant job
as follows:
Vj,t = −cj + Etβt,t+1
[
qj(θj,t)JNj,t+1 + (1− qj(θj,t))Vj,t+1
]
. (30)
With a probability of qj(θj,t), the firms matches with a worker and the match
yields a return of JNj,t+1. With a probability of 1 − qj(θj,t), the job remains
vacant with a return of Vj,t+1. As long as the value of a vacancy is greater than
zero, a firm will post new vacancies. In equilibrium, free market entry drives the
profit from opening a vacancy to zero, which implies Vj,t = 0 for any t. This
yields the vacancy posting condition
cj
qj(θj,t)
= Etβt,t+1JNj,t+1, (31)
which states that the expected cost of hiring a worker, cj/qj(θj,t), is equal to
the expected profit generated by a new match.
The value of a newly hired worker enjoyed by a firm, therefore, is given by
JNj,t = mcj,t
Pj,t
Pt
Aj,ta
N
j,t − wNj,t
+Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj )
[∫∞
a˚j,t+1
Jj,t+1(aj,t+1)dFj(aj,t+1)− Fj (˚aj,t+1)Tj
]
,
(32)
where mcj,t denotes the sector-specific real marginal costs of providing one
additional unit of output. We distinguish between endogenous and exogenous
separations. With probability 1− ρxj , the worker survives exogenous job destruc-
tion. For a surviving match, a realization of the idiosyncratic productivity below
the critical threshold a˚j,t+1 leads to endogenous separation and the firm incurs
firing costs Tj .
Similarly, the present discount value of a continuing job with productivity
aj,t to the employer is
Jj,t(aj,t) = mcj,t Pj,tPt Aj,taj,t − wj,t(aj,t)
+Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj )
·
[∫∞
a˚j,t+1
Jj,t+1(aj,t+1)dFj(aj,t+1)− Fj (˚aj,t+1)Tj
] (33)
In equations (32) and (33) the term mcj,t Pj,tPt Aj,taj,t − wj,t(aj,t) represents the
net return of a match, and Jj,t+1−Fj (˚aj,t+1)Tj represents the present discounted
firm surplus, if the match is not destroyed.
In this model, an expression for the real marginal cost mcj,t can be derived by
using equation (12) and the condition that a firm is indifferent between continuing
a match and separating from the worker, Jj,t(a˚j,t) + Tj = 0 (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 2003). Combining these two equations and solving for mcj,t, we
obtain:
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mcj,t = PtPj,tAj,ta˚j,t wj,t(˚aj,t)− Tj−Etβt,t+1 (1− ρx) [ ∫∞a˚j,t+1 Jj,t+1(aj,t+1)dFj(aj,t+1)−Fj (˚aj,t+1)Tj
]  (34)
From equation (34), it can be seen that real marginal costs amount to the wage
minus the the firing costs and the expected future return generated by the match,
weighted by the marginal product of labor. As pointed out by Trigari (2009),
the real marginal costs are, in the presence of search and matching frictions, not
equal to the wage divided by the marginal product of labor. Instead, they also
depend on the expected present-discounted payoff of preserving a match, which
internalizes the firing costs.
Wage bargaining
In each period, firms and workers bargain over the real wage for that period,
regardless of whether they form a continuing or a new match. The wage is set
according to Nash bargaining. The worker and the firm share the joint surplus
and the worker receives the fraction η ∈ [0, 1]. Since the wage depends on the
idiosyncratic productivity of the worker, the wage bargaining rules for continuing
and new matches are given by
η(Jj,t(aj,t) + Tj) = (1− η)(Wj,t(aj,t)− Ut), (35)
and
ηJNj,t(aj,t) = (1− η)(WNj,t − Ut), (36)
respectively. The bargaining rule for continuing workers, represented by equation
(35), internalizes firing costs Tj , whereas new workers are not subject to firing
costs because in the period they are hired their idiosyncratic productivity aNjt is
assumed to be above the critical threshold a˚jt.
We can now derive the wage for continuing workers using the Bellman
equations (10)-(13), (15)-(16) and the bargaining rules for continuing and new
matches, equation (17) and (18)
wj,t(aj,t) = η
[
mcj,t
Pj,t
Pt
Aj,taj,t + cjθj,t + (1− ζj,t)Tj
]
+ (1− η)b. (37)
The agreed wage for new workers is equal to
wNjt = η
[
mcj,t
Pj,t
Pt
Aj,ta
N
j,t + cjθj,t − ζj,tTj
]
+ (1− η)b, (38)
where ζj,t = Etβt,t+1(1− ρxj ).
The wages that new and continuing workers receive consist of two elements.
First, if firms have complete bargaining power, the bargained wage will equal
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the benefits from unemployment b, which includes unemployment insurance
payments and welfare captured by the replacement rate as well as the utility
derived from not working. Second, if workers have complete market power, the
wage will be the match revenue mcj,t Pj,tPt Aj,taj,t, plus the saved hiring costs,
cjθj,t, minus the present discounted firing costs, ζj,tTj , and plus the savings on
firing costs17, Tj , in the case of continuing workers. In cases where the bargaining
power of firms and workers is between these two extremes, the bargaining power
of workers η attaches weight to the two elements. It follows from equation (38)
that the wage of new workers differs from those of continuing workers as they
do not include firing costs related to endogenous job separations in the initial
period.
7.2. The log-linearized model
We now derive the log-linear equations for the domestic economy. A symmet-
ric set of equations specifies the economy of the foreign country. The log-linearized
version of the model is derived through a first-order Taylor approximation, while
variables with a tilde denote the log-deviations from a deterministic steady-state.
From the household’s utility maximization, we can derive a log-linearized Euler
equation
c˜t = Et {c˜t+1} −
(
r˜t − Et {p˜it+1} − βˆt
)
,
and money demand from equation (9)
m˜Ht − p˜t = σmy˜t +
(
1− 4¯
4¯
)
σm (rˆt − rˆmt ) ,
where βˆt denotes the log of the endogenous time-discount rate, p˜it ≡ p˜t− p˜t−1
represents the log CPI inflation and the log differential in interest rates on assets
and money is given by 4¯ = 1− β (1− r¯m). The price of a consumption good
bundle p˜t consists of prices for home-produced goods p˜Ht and goods produced in
the rest of the currency union p˜F,t. The log interest rate differential is given by
rˆmt = log (1 + rˆmt /1 + r¯m), with r¯m being the steady-state zero inflation interest
rate.
The endogenous discount factor depends negatively on consumption according
to
βˆt = ςt − ψβc˜t,
where ςt denotes an exogenous shock to the discount factor that obeys an
autoregressive process. We, nevertheless, assume that ψ is small so that the
effect is negligible on medium-term dynamics.
17Firing costs are assumed to affect endogenous separations, only. They do not occur for
new workers in the first period, as the idiosyncratic productivity for those is per assumption
above the threshold level.
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The demand of home tradables depends on the non-tradable to tradable price
relation and on the terms of trade
y˜H,t = α(1−α)γτ˜tΦ1 + (1− η)
[
αx˜tτ¯
γ−1 + (1− α)x˜∗t τ¯
]
+αc˜tτ¯γ−1 + (1−α)c˜∗t τ¯ .
with Φ1 ≡ 1+τ¯2α+(1−α)τ¯(1−γ) . To derive this equation, we used the tradables
consumption to aggregate consumption relation and equation (26). We derive
the demand for non-tradables using the market clearing condition and the
relation of non-tradables to aggregate consumption, which also depends on the
non-tradables to tradables price relation
y˜N,t = −γx˜t + c˜t.
We now relate the terms of trade and the non-tradable to tradable price
relation to CPI inflation and home prices for both domestic as well as foreign-
produced tradable goods
τ˜t = τ˜t−1 + (4q˜t + ˜piF,t∗ − p˜it)− (p˜iH,t − p˜it),
x˜t = x˜t−1 + p˜iNt − p˜iH,t − η(1− α)4τ˜t.
The price of domestically produced goods, nevertheless, is subject to labor
market imperfections. If we now log-linearize equation (17) around the steady-
state, we can derive two New Keynesian Philips Curves
p˜iH,t = βEtp˜iH,t+1 +
(1− ν)(1− νβ)
ν
m˜cT,t, (39)
p˜iN,t = βEtp˜iN,t+1 +
(1− ν)(1− νβ)
ν
m˜cN,t.
where m˜cj,t is defined as the log-deviation of marginal costs from their steady-
state value µ. Marginal costs m˜cj,t are derived using a log-linear first-order
approximation of Equation (23). In general, CPI depends on home and foreign
prices as well as the terms of trade
p˜it = µp˜iH,t + (1− µ)p˜iN,t + µ(1− α)4τ˜t.
Net exports depend on the difference of time-varying discount factors, the
terms of trade and expected future net exports
n˜xt =
P¯F C¯F
(1− α)C¯
[
(1− α)βˆR,t − 2α(1− α)(µ− 1)Et4τ˜t+1
]
+ Etn˜xt+1.
Net indebtedness evolves from previous trade imbalances and net exports in
the current period
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b˜t =
1
β
b˜t−1 + n˜xt.
Given the indebtedness of the economy, we can express the current account
as
c˜at = b˜t − 11 + g b˜t−1,
with cat denoting the current account normalized by steady-state growth.
From the labor market equilibrium, we get the log-linear average real wage
per sector
w˜j,t =
1
w¯j
[
ηm¯cjA¯j
P¯j
P¯
a¯j
(
m˜cj,t + p˜j,t − p˜t + A˜j,t + a˜j,t
)
+cθ¯θ˜t + T˜j ((1− ρ˜t) (n˜t − n˜t−1)− ρ˜tρ¯t − β(1− ρx)σEt (y˜j,t − y˜j,t−1))
]
with the job creation condition
θ˜j,t =
1
ξ
[
(1− η)βm¯cj(a¯jN −˚¯aj)
(
χj
cj θ¯j
ξ
)
EtΩ1 + σEt (y˜j,t − y˜j,t−1)
]
, .
Ω1 =
(
m˜cjt+1 + pj,t − pt + A˜jt+1 − a¯i
a¯Nj −˚¯aj
˚˜ajt+1
)
and the job destruction condition
θ˜j,t =
(
1− η
ηcθ¯
)[
m¯cjA¯j
P¯j
P¯
Ω2 + β(1− ρx)T˜jσEt (y˜j,t − y˜j,t−1)
]
,
Ω2 =
 ˚¯aj
(
m˜cj,t + pj,t − pt + A˜j,t +˚˜aj,t
)
+ β(1− ρx) (H (˚a¯j)−˚¯aj)
Et
(
σEt (y˜j,t − y˜j,t−1) + m˜cj,t+1 + A˜j,t+1 + ˚¯ajH (˚a¯j)−˚¯aj˚˜aj,t+1
)

In our model, we assumed a currency union with a common monetary policy.
In this case, the central bank targets inflation and output stability for the whole
currency union
r˜t = ρr r˜t−1 + ρy [δy˜∗t + (1− δ)y˜t] + ρpi (δp˜i∗t + (1− δ)p˜it) + rt , (40)
where δ attaches weights to the importance of the economy in the monetary
policy function and rt
i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2rt) is a shock to monetary policy. The degree
of interest rate smoothing ρr and the reaction coefficients to inflation and output,
ρpi and ρy, are all positive.
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Table 1: Business cycle properties, variety of shocks
Variable Euro Area BenchmarkStandard H-M Sensitivity
GDP 0.0164 0.0164 0.0164 0.0164
Vacancies 0.1079 0.0485 0.0416 0.0478
Unemployment 0.0712 0.0126 0.0617 0.0117
Employment 0.0013 0.0371 0.0014
Inflation 0.0069 0.0497 0.0029 0.0495
Production 0.0241 0.0365 0.0155 0.0364
Employment 0.0057 0.0276 0.0265 0.0281
Vacancies 0.2104 0.0348 0.2153
Job searchers 0.1642 0.0739 0.1716
Real wage 0.0135 0.0889 0.0032 0.0902
Labor market tightness 0.1573 0.0531 0.1018 0.0517
Production 0.0109 0.0319 0.0276 0.0318
Employment 0.0072 0.0277 0.0514 0.0281
Vacancies 0.1412 0.0524 0.1491
Job searcher 0.1834 0.0502 0.1888
Real wage 0.0101 0.6656 0.0054 0.6604
Labor market tightness 0.1573 0.0531 0.1018 0.0517
Output, real wages T 0.8622 0.1666 0.9684 0.1444
Output, real wages NT 0.4381 0.0969 0.8992 0.0841
Output, Inflation 0.5433 0.0128 0.3349 0.0026
Real wages T, Inflation 0.3226 0.9738 0.4709 0.9746
Real wages NT, Inflation -0.4357 0.9777 0.6105 0.9774
Unemployment,
vacancies
-0.5766 -0.2511 -0.9408 -0.2273
Notes: Observed and simulated business cycle properties for the Eurozone (EA-12).
The observed statistics are based on seasonally adjusted quarterly data from 2006:Q1
to 2012:Q2. Variables, except inflation, are transformed into logarithms. All the series
are HP filtered (frequency 1600), so that only the cyclical component remains. The
simulated business cycle statistics are based on 1000 simulations over 100 quarter
horizon and are HP filtered for comparison purposes. Simulated figures are averages
across simulations.
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Figure 5: Positive oil supply shock, labor market conditions
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Notes: Each panel shows the response of the model variables to an oil supply
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
7.4 Figures supplement 40
Figure 6: Positive oil supply shock, labor market conditions
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Impulse response functions to a positive oil supply shock
Notes: Each panel shows the response of the model variables to an oil supply
shock of one standard deviation. The horizontal axes measure time, expressed
in quarters.
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